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Abstract— Most existing anonymization work has been done
on static datasets, which have no update and need only one-
time publication. Recent studies consider anonymizing dynamic
datasets with external updates: the datasets are updated with
record insertions and/or deletions. This paper addresses a new
problem: anonymous re-publication of datasets with internal
updates, where the attribute values of each record are dynami-
cally updated. This is an important and challenging problem for
attribute values of records are updating frequently in practice
and existing methods are unable to deal with such a situation.
We initiate a formal study of anonymous re-publication of
dynamic datasets with internal updates, and show the invalidation
of existing methods. We introduce theoretical definition and
analysis of dynamic datasets, and present a general privacy
disclosure framework that is applicable to all anonymous re-
publication problems. We propose a new counterfeited gen-
eralization principle called m-Distinct to effectively anonymize
datasets with both external updates and internal updates. We also
develop an algorithm to generalize datasets to meet m-Distinct.
The experiments conducted on real-world data demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many organizations are required to publish individual
records or other datasets for different purposes. The released
data should provide useful information as much as possible,
while the privacy issue should also be considered: any sensitive
information of individuals should not be disclosed.
For example, a hospital tends to publish a dataset of medical
records for research purpose, meanwhile it does not hope to
reveal any sensitive information to public. Table I illustrates
such an original dataset. Apparently, the “Name” attribute,
which explicitly indicates an individual (called identifier),
should be hidden from the public. Moreover, the other non-
sensitive attributes (“Zipcode”, “Hours/week”) should not be
published directly either. Because with the help of background
knowledge, an adversary may identify an individual by the
combination of these attribute values. This kind of attacks and
the combination of these attributes are often referred to as
linking attack and quasi-identifiers(QI) respectively.
Generalization [1] is a prevailing technique that can be
exploited to anonymize datasets and protect sensitive infor-
mation. It hides the specific attribute values by publishing less
specific forms of QI attribute values. Since several individual
records may have the same generalized attribute values, which
will causes these records indistinguishable. We call the pub-
lished records that have the same generalized QI attribute value
a QI-group. Besides, generalization is presence resistant [2]
in a certain degree as it does not publish the accurate QI
attribute values directly. This feature makes itself superior to
anatomy [3] et al. in some extent.
A. Motivation
Most existing anonymization researches have focused on
static datasets. However, real datasets are dynamic. These
datasets are usually updated frequently, thus re-publication
is required. Anonymizing and re-publishing dynamic datasets
is a challenging task. Not only is the increasing number of
publication times required, but also both of the old and new
sensitive information need to be well protected.
The complexity of dynamic datasets anonymization is
caused by data updates. We can classify dynamic dataset
updates to two types: external update and internal update.
Intuitively, external update is the update of the records in a
dataset, e.g., record insertion and deletion will cause external
update as the total records in the dataset are not the same
as before. Internal update is the update of each record’s
attribute values. In other words, in a dynamic dataset with
internal updates, the attribute values of each record may be
dynamically updated. For example, as a person’s age grows,
her/his salary may increase. In addition, we have the following
observation about internal updates:
Observation 1 In a dataset, the updates of attribute values
are seldom arbitrary: there are certain correlations between
the old value and the new one.
For example, a person’s current highest degree is “bache-
lor”; several years later, although we can not determine her/his
highest degree without complementary knowledge, we can
conclude that it will not be lower than “bachelor” and will be
one of {“Bachelor”, “Master”, “PHD.”} with different non-
zero probabilities.
Based on the observation above, in this paper we assume
that all updates on sensitive values are not arbitrary1. The
possible updates and their probabilities are estimable, and can
be treated as background knowledge known to public.
To demonstrate the challenges brought by internal updates,
we give an example with only internal updates as follows.
1As explained later, if all updates on sensitive attribute values are random,
this dataset can be treated as a static one in anonymization.
TABLE I
MICRODATA T1
Name Zip. H Disease
Ken 14k 20 Dyspepsia
Julia 16k 23 Pneumonia
Tom 24k 32 Pneumonia
Harry 26k 35 Gastritis
Lily 29k 17 Glaucoma
Ben 31k 19 Flu
TABLE II
MICRODATA T2
Name Zip. H Disease
Ken 14k 20 Dyspepsia
Julia 18k 31 Lung Cancer
Tom 15k 27 Pneumonia
Harry 23k 32 Dyspepsia
Lily 12k 17 Glaucoma
Ben 26k 35 Pneumonia
TABLE III
GENERALIZATION T ∗
1
Name GID Zip. H Disease
Ken 1 [14k, 16k] [20, 23] Dyspepsia
Julia 1 [14k, 16k] [20, 23] Pneumonia
Tom 2 [24k, 26k] [32, 35] Pneumonia
Harry 2 [24k, 26k] [32, 35] Gastritis
Lily 3 [29k, 31k] [17, 19] Glaucoma
Ben 3 [29k, 31k] [17, 19] Flu
TABLE IV
GENERALIZATION T ∗
2
Name GID Zip. H Disease
Ken 1 [12k, 14k] [17, 20] Dyspepsia
Lily 1 [12k, 14k] [17, 20] Glaucoma
Julia 2 [15k, 18k] [27, 31] Lung Cancer
Tom 2 [15k, 18k] [27, 31] Pneumonia
Harry 3 [23k, 26k] [32, 35] Dyspepsia
Ben 3 [23k, 26k] [32, 35] Pneumonia
TABLE V
COUNTERFEIT GENERALIZATION T ∗
2
Name GID Zip. H Disease
Ken 1 [14k, 15k] [19, 27] Dyspepsia
Tom 1 [14k, 15k] [19, 27] Pneumonia
Julia 2 [18k, 23k] [31, 32] Lung Cancer
Harry 2 [18k, 23k] [31, 32] Dyspepsia
Lily 3 [10k, 12k] [16, 17] Glaucoma
c1 3 [10k, 12k] [16, 17] Pneumonia
Ben 4 [26k, 27k] [35, 37] Pneumonia
c2 4 [26k, 27k] [35, 37] Cataract
TABLE VI
COUNTERFEIT
STATISTICS
GID Count
3 1
4 1
Note that the challenges remain when external and internal
updates coexist.
Consider a hospital that carries out a project of tracking
disease evolution. Every two months, it releases medical
records of the same group of patients to other institutes;
meanwhile, it also hopes to preserve the patients’ privacy.
The original microdata of the 1st and 2nd releases are shown
in Table I and Table II. In each table, there are 6 records and
each one corresponds to a unique patient. In the 2nd release,
some attribute values of the records (underlined) are updated.
1) Invalidation of l-diversity: We take l-diversity to illus-
trate the invalidation of existing publication solutions, and
the others are similar. Briefly, l-diversity requires that every
QI-group should contain at least l “well-presented” sensitive
values. One simple interpretation is “distinct”, which means
there are at least l distinct sensitive values in each QI-group.
Table III and Table IV are the published data of the 1st
and 2nd releases respectively2, both are 2-diverse. 2-diversity
ensures that an adversary can not determine the exact disease
of each patient if ignoring the correlation between the two
releases. However, in practice, the situation can get worse.
For example, suppose an adversary knows that the medical
records of Ben are in both releases. Furthermore, s/he also
knows his detail information of each time3: <Ben, 31k, 19>
in the 1st release and updated to be <Ben, 26k, 35> in the 2nd
release. The adversary will reason as follows: Ben must be in
group 3 of both releases. The diseases he may contract are in
{Glaucoma, Flu} and {Dyspepsia, Pneumonia} respectively.
The adversary knows that, although Ben’s disease may be
different in the two releases, there must be correlation between
them. Since glaucoma can not update to both dyspepsia and
pneumonia, the adversary concludes that Ben must contract flu
in the 1st release; both of glaucoma and flu can not update to
dyspepsia, s/he can determine that Ben contracts pneumonia
in the 2nd release.
By exploiting the correlation between the two releases, the
2Actually, published tables do not contain the identifier attribute “Name”,
we keep it here just for the convenience of explanation.
3The information can be acquired from many sources such as voter list.
adversary can also disclose more sensitive information such
as the disease of Ken and Lily in both releases, the disease of
Julia in the 1st release etc.
2) Invalidation of m-Invariance: m-Invariance [4] was pro-
posed to re-publish dynamic dataset with only external up-
dates. It achieves anonymization by ensuring that in each
release, the QI-group to which an arbitrary record belongs
always has the same set of sensitive values. However, if there
are internal updates in the dataset, the requirement of m-
Invariance may be never met.
Suppose in the 1st release Julia is in a QI-group of which
the set of sensitive values is {Dyspepsia, Pneumonia}. Later,
the disease she contracted is deteriorated into lung cancer,
which will lead to that in the 2nd release. The QI-group Julia
is in can never contain the same set of sensitive values, for
the QI-group must contain lung caner, which is not covered
by {Dyspepsia, Pneumonia}, thus the requirement of m-
Invariance is unreachable.
B. Contributions
The internal updates causes the ineffectiveness of existing
solutions in privacy preservation, because internal updates can
enhance the adversary’s background knowledge and shrink the
scope of an individual’s possible sensitive values. The situation
will get worse as more publications are released, which will
provide an increasing amount of background knowledge.
Let us revisit the previous example. By using our solution
in this paper, Table V and VI will be published, instead
of Table IV for the 2nd release. Eight records in Table V
(including 2 counterfeit records c1 and c2) are partitioned into
4 QI-groups. Table VI contains the counterfeit statistics of
Table V.
Reconsider that an adversary attempts to disclose the disease
of Ben. S/he knows that Ben must in group 3 and group 4 of
the two releases respectively. However, s/he can not determine
the exact diseases Ben contracted in both releases. Because
glaucoma may update to be cataract, and flu may update to
be pneumonia: the two possible diseases in the 1st release
can not be excluded even exploiting the correlation between
the two releases. Similarly, s/he can not exclude any possible
disease of Ben in the 2nd release either. Although Table VI
indicates that there are counterfeit records in the 2nd release,
it provides no help for the adversary to exclude any possible
disease of Ben.
The core idea of our solution is to maintain the indistin-
guishability of the sensitive values in each QI-group persis-
tently, even though there are internal updates and the adversary
exploits the correlation between different releases. In each
release, we partition each individual’s record into a QI-group
that will not lead to any exclusion of its possible sensitive
values. We also exploit counterfeit records if not enough
records to form such a QI-group for an individual.
In this paper, we initiate a formal study on the anonymiza-
tion of dynamic datasets with both internal and external
updates. Internal updates lead to quite different challenges
to anonymization of dynamic datasets from that of external
updates, and invalidate all existing solutions. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to study internal updates
problem.
We first give a formal description of dynamic datasets
and updates (Section II). We then propose a novel privacy
disclosure framework called SUG (Section III), which is appli-
cable to all anonymous re-publication problems. By exploiting
SUG, we show how the inference works and how to estimate
the disclosure risk of sensitive information. Following that,
we introduce a counterfeit generalization principle called m-
Distinct (Section IV) to securely anonymize and re-publish
dynamic datasets with both internal and external updates. An
algorithm is also developed to achieve m-Distinct generaliza-
tion (Section V). Finally, experiments are conducted on real-
world data to show the inadequacy of existing solutions and
the effectiveness of our solution (Section VI).
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Consider that T is the microdata table that needs to be
published, it has an identifier attribute ID, m QI attributes
Q = {Q1, Q2, ..., Qm} and a sensitive attribute4 S. Each
record t is organized as < id, q1, q2, ..., qm, s >. For an
attribute A, record t’s value on A is represented as t[A]. We
denote the generalized table by T ∗ and the generalized record
by t∗. If several records in T ∗ have the same generalized QI
values, these records form a QI-group g. If record t is in QI-
group g, we denote t’s candidate sensitive set C as the set of
sensitive values in g.
Let i be the timestamp, and Ti and T ∗i be the microdata table
and generalized table of the ith publication, respectively. If in
Ti, there is a record ti (ti ∈ Ti) such that t[ID] = ti[ID], we
say ti is t’s ith version. Generally, we say two records which
appears in different publications are the different versions of
the same record, if they have the same ID attribute value.
A. Dynamic Dataset
Generally, a dataset is dynamic iff its data is different at
different time. The differences are due to two types of updates:
4In this paper, we focus mainly on discrete sensitive attributes, since
continuous values can be discretized by various methods.
external update and internal update.
Definition 1 (External Update) For any integer i and j (0 ≤
i < j), if a record t (t 6= φ) satisfies one of the following
conditions:
1) ti ∈ Ti and tj /∈ Tj .
2) ti /∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj .
We say that t is an external update of Tj in contrast to Ti.
Based on the definition above, there are two types of specific
external updates: insertion and deletion, which correspond to
condition 2 and 1, respectively. Another type of update, which
occurs inside records, is called internal update.
Definition 2 (Internal Update) For integer i and j (0 ≤ i <
j), suppose ti ∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj holds for a record t. If ti and
tj satisfy at least one of the following conditions:
1) ti[Q] 6= tj [Q].
2) ti[S] 6= tj [S].
Then we say that there are internal updates on t in the period
of [i, j].
Internal updates may occur on either QI attribute values
or sensitive attribute values. Especially, updates on sensitive
attribute values will bring more difficulty to the anonymization
of dynamic datasets as they enhance the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge about sensitive information.
Following external update definition, we have the definition
of external dynamic datasets as follows.
Definition 3 (External Dynamic Dataset) For integer i and
j (0 ≤ i < j), if dataset T has the following properties:
1) ∃ i, j, Tj is externally updated in contrast to Ti.
2) ∀ i, j, if ti ∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj holds for any record t, then
∀ A, ti[A] = tj [A] must holds.
Strictly, we say that T is external dynamic.
Intuitively, if there are record insertions and/or deletions,
and the attribute values of each record will not change as time
goes, the dataset is external dynamic. Similarly, we have the
formulation of internal dynamic dataset as follows.
Definition 4 (Internal Dynamic Dataset) For integer i and
j (0 ≤ i < j), if T has the following properties:
1) ∃ i, j, and internal updates that happen on a record in
the period of [i, j].
2) ∀ i, j, Ti and Tj has the same records.
Strictly, we say that T is internal dynamic.
Anonymization of internal dynamic datasets has never been
addressed in the literature. In this paper, we deal with fully
dynamic datasets, which contain both external and internal
updates.
Definition 5 (Fully Dynamic Dataset) For integer i and
j (0 ≤ i < j), if dataset T has at least one of the following
properties:
1) ∃ i, j, and Tj that has external updates in contrast to Ti;
2) ∃ i, j, and internal update(s) occurring on at least one
record during [i, j].
Then, we say that the dataset is fully dynamic.
Both of the internal dynamic dataset and external dynamic
dataset are special cases of fully dynamic dataset as fully
dynamic dataset may be updated by internal updates and
external updates. As explained in [4], external update brings
critical absence and other challenges into dynamic dataset
anonymization. However, Internal update will leads to different
challenges comparing to the previous work.
First, there will be an ith version ti for an individual’s
record t if it has not been removed from Ti. Furthermore,
each version is an access to the record’s sensitive information
and the total amount is increasing as time evolves. This is
different from the situations in static dataset and external
dynamic dataset, which always have immobilizing record for
an individual.
Second, there is correlation between different versions of
an individual’s record. In other words, the series of internal
updates on an individual’s record are not independent. That
makes the situation more complex: in contrast to external up-
date, the record insertion or deletion are usually independent5.
Third, the sensitive attribute value will be updated by
internal update, which means the current one may be different
from the historical values. Thus when publishing a dataset,
both of the historical sensitive values and the current one
need be well protected. The situation will get worse as the
increasing releases of the individual’s sensitive value.
Forth,one breach of sensitive value may lead to chain-action
breach if exploiting their correlation [6].
B. Problem Formulation
Additional background knowledge rose by the updates pro-
motes the disclosure probability of sensitive information. In
this paper we classify the background knowledge into two
types: explicit background knowledge is specifically related
to the publication of the dataset while implicit background
knowledge is more general.
Definition 6 (Explicit Background Knowledge)
i) For any positive integer i, there is an external knowledge
table Ei =< ID,Q1, Q2, ..., Qm > corresponding to Ti,
which contains the ID attribute and QI attributes data of Ti.
ii) In the span of [1, n], we denote the union of the published
tables as PTn =
⋃n
i=1 T
∗
i , the union of external knowledge
tables as ETn =
⋃n
i=1Ei.
At any time n, an adversary’s explicit background knowl-
edge consists of PTn and ETn.
Definition 7 (Implicit Background Knowledge)
Excluding the explicit background knowledge, the information
which is commonly known to public and can provide help
to the adversary’s attack consists of the implicit background
5Actually, this is an implicit assumption the previous work [4], [5] makes.
knowledge. Such as the domain and hierarchy of each at-
tribute, the semantic of each attribute value, the probability
of an internal update etc.
Definition 6 implies that the adversaries’ explicit back-
ground knowledge is incremental and will be enhanced by
each re-publication operation. On the contrary, the implicit
background knowledge is usually static and invariant. At the
time of the nth publication, we denote all the background
knowledge of an adversary as BKn.
Example 1 Revisit the example in section I-A.1. In the 2nd
release, the explicit background knowledge includes PT2 and
ET2. PT2 is the union of table III and table IV, ET2 is the
union of table I and table II, in which the “Disease” attribute
is removed.
The rest of information that can also provide assistance to
the adversary consists of the implicit background knowledge.
Such as the domain of work hour per week is [0, 100], the
Disease attribute is categorical etc. Especially, the background
knowledge introduced by internal updates is also implicit:
the probability of any attribute value ai update to be aj ,
represented as Ptrans(ai, aj), is known to public.
Based on the background knowledge, the threat measure-
ment to fully dynamic dataset, is defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Disclosure Risk) For a positive integer i, sup-
pose ti ∈ Ti holds for t. Before T ∗n+1 released, the disclosure
risk rn(ti) is the probability of an adversary (with the help of
BKn) linking ti with its actual sensitive value ti[S].
As shown below, the disclosure risk in dynamic dataset is
also dynamic. Specifically, it contains two-folded meaning.
First, as time evolves, the disclosure risk of the same version
of a record is fluctuant. Because the dataset re-publications
increase the adversary’s explicit background knowledge (def-
inition 6), which may lead to different risk estimation results
at different moments. Second, at the same time, the disclosure
risk of different versions of a record may be different.
Example 2 Revisit Julia’s records in table III and IV. When
T ∗1 was released, the disclosure risk of her disease is 50%,
because the QI-group she was in has 2 indistinguishable
sensitive values.
After the release of T ∗2 , the discourse risk of the disease she
contracted in the 1st release increases to be 100%. Meanwhile,
now the adversary has different disclosure risks about Julia’s
disease: 100% for the old disease in the 1st release and 50%
for the new one in the 2nd release.
The disclosure risk is a measurement for separate record
privacy. In order to measure the disclosure risk during the
entire re-publication process, we define the re-publication risk.
Definition 9 (Re-publication Risk) Suppose dataset T is
fully dynamic. T ∗1 , T ∗2 , T ∗3 , ... is a sequential release of T .
For any integer i and n (0 < i ≤ n), if rn(ti) ≤ α (α is
minimum and α ∈ [0, 1]) always holds when ti ∈ Ti, then we
call the re-publication risk of T is α.
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Fig. 1. Julia’s SUG.Her actual sensitive value is represented by the circled
dot.
Intuitively, the re-publication risk is a minimized upper-
bound of all disclosure risks. Therefore, we state the problem
of anonymization of fully dynamic dataset as, given a fully
dynamic dataset T , sequentially release T ∗1 , T ∗2 , T ∗3 , ... so that
the re-publication risk is as lower as possible and the utility
of publications is maximized.
III. PRIVACY DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
In this section we propose a framework, Sensitive attribute
Update Graph (SUG), to track an individual’s possible sen-
sitive information and show how the disclosure happens. In
section III-C, we will demonstrate the applicability of the
framework by applying it to the previous work.
A. Sensitive attribute Update Graph
The key idea of SUG is to represent all the possible
sensitive values and updates of a record in a graph: each node
represents a possible sensitive value and each edge represents
a feasible update on a sensitive value. We call an update
U(ss, st) feasible only if sensitive value ss has non-zero
probability update to st.
Suppose that before T ∗n+1 is released, t
′
1, t
′
2, ..., t
′
I (I ≤ n)
are the sequential versions of record t which exist in the
corresponding releases of T . Formally, t’s SUG is defined
as follows:
Definition 10 (SUG) Before T ∗n+1 released, t’s sensitive at-
tribute update graph is denoted by Gn(V,E), such that
• there is a one-to-one mapping between node vi,j (vi,j ∈
V ) and one possible sensitive value si,j of Ci6, where i
is any integer between 1 and I .
• the weight of each node vi,j is the probability of an ad-
versary linking t′i to si,j only with the help of background
knowledge (BKi −BKi−1).
• an edge (vi,j , vi+1,k) represents a feasible update
U(si,j , si+1,k) and its weight w(vi,j , vi+1,k) represents
the probability of that feasible update happens, which is
equal to Ptrans(si,j , si+1,k).
For a SUG, the weights of nodes and edges are determined
by the background knowledge. Specifically, the weight of a
node is the linking probability between t and a sensitive
candidate value without the help of historical background
knowledge. That’s similar to the linking probability in the
publication of static dataset. However, in dynamic dataset, the
6 We call the nodes which represent the sensitive values in Ci form a
corresponding candidate node set Vi.
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Fig. 2. SUG
linking probability is determined together with the historical
information hidden in the other parts of the graph.
It is apparent that a record’s candidate sensitive sets and
their correlation are all encoded into a SUG. From the
adversary’s perspective, Gn(V,E) contains all the background
knowledge about t’s sensitive information before T ∗n+1 re-
leased. Thus on the basis of Gn(V,E), s/he can deduce the
disclosure risk rn(t
′
i) for any integer i between 1 and I .
Example 3 Fig. 1 is Julia’s SUG after Table III and IV
released. Without additional knowledge and specific declara-
tion, we follow the random world assumption [7] that all the
sensitive values in a sensitive candidate set have the equal
linking probability, and the updates on a sensitive value have
equal probability to happen. Thus the weight of every node
and edge is 1/2 in fig. 1. The disclosure risk r2(t′1) is 100%
as v1,1 has not outgoing edge; r2(t
′
2) is 50% as both v2,1 and
v2,2 has an incoming edge from v1,2.
However, the SUG can be further reduced by excluding
some invalidate nodes and edges. E.g., in fig. 1, there’s no
edge connect to v1,1, that indicates dyspepsia can update to
neither lung cancer nor pneumonia. Thus we know that Julia
is impossible to contract dyspepsia and v1,1 has no validate
information. So we can deduce a subgraph only contains the
validate information:
Definition 11 (feasible sub-SUG) A feasible sub-SUG
G′n(V
′, E′) is a subgraph of Gn(V,E) induced as follows:
Delete node v and its connected edges from Gn(V,E) if
one of the following conditions holds:
• v ∈ V1 and deg−(v) = 0;
• v ∈ VI and deg+(v) = 0;
• v ∈ Vi, i ∈ (1, I), and at least deg+(v) = 0 or
deg−(v) = 0 holds;
Repeat the process until no deletion left.
The above definition also provides a method to induce a
feasible sub-SUG from SUG. Actually, the deducing process
is also the major part of the attack: excluding invalidate
information so as to narrow the possible space of the sensitive
values.
Fig. 2(b) is the feasible sub-SUG deduced from fig. 2(a).
As we observe, in a feasible sub-SUG, every path that begins
from node in V ′1 and ends with node in V
′
I (we call it a
feasible path) may represent the actual path that indicates
the evolvement of t’s sensitive value. Thus at a specific time,
once we get a record’s feasible sub-SUG, we can calculate
the probability of each possible path, which can lead to the
estimation of its disclosure risks rn(t
′
1), rn(t
′
2), ..., rn(t
′
I).
B. Disclosure Risk Estimation
The second part of the attack is the disclosure risk estima-
tion. Since every path in the feasible sub-SUG may be the one
which contains all the correct sensitive values and updates, the
weight portion of the feasible paths that crossing a node is just
the probability that the correct path contains it, which is also
the probability of linking t′i to the sensitive value represented
by the node. Thus rn(t
′
i) equals to the weight portion of all
the feasible paths that crossing the node representing t′i[S] in
V
′
i .
In order to calculate the risk, we first enumerate all the
feasible paths by traversing G′n(V
′
, E
′
). Then we compute the
weight of every feasible path with the help of related nodes and
edges. Assume pk = {v
′
1,x1, v
′
2,x2 , ..., v
′
I,xI
} is any feasible
path in G′n(V
′
, E
′
), v
′
i,xi
is a node in V ′i . The weight of pk
is the product of all the nodes and edges it traverses:
w(pk) = w(v
′
I,xI
)
I−1∏
i=1
w(v
′
i,xi
)w(v
′
i,xi
, v
′
i+1,xi+1) (1)
Finally, picking out all the feasible paths that crossing the
node represents t′i[S], their portion equals to rn(t
′
i):
rn(t
′
i) =
∑Ki
k
′=1
w(pk′ )∑K
k=1 w(pk)
(2)
K is the total number of feasible paths and Ki is the count
of feasible paths that crossing the node represents t′i[S].
Example 4 Consider the feasible sub-SUG in fig. 2(b). There
are totally 5 feasible paths in this graph. Enumerating them
from top to down, their weights are 1/18, 1/36, 1/72, 1/72 and
1/18 respectively. The sum is 1/6.
There are 3 feasible paths crossing node v′1,2:
{v
′
1,2, v
′
2,3, v
′
3,2}, {v
′
1,2, v
′
2,4, v
′
3,3} and {v
′
1,2, v
′
2,4, v
′
3,4}.
So r3(t
′
1) = (1/36 + 1/72 + 1/72)/(1/6) = 1/3. Similarly,
we have r3(t
′
2) = 1/6 and r3(t
′
3) = 1/12.
We can estimate rn(t
′
1), rn(t
′
2), ..., rn(t
′
I) based on
G
′
n(V
′
, E
′
). Generally, for any positive integer j, in order
to estimate rj(t
′
1), rj(t
′
2), ..., rj(t
′
I), we should construct its
feasible sub-SUG G′j(V
′
, E
′
) with the help of BKj .
The increasing releases of T will lead t’s feasible sub-SUG
dynamic and growing. Thus rj(t
′
i) is usually not equal to
rk(t
′
i) (j 6= k). Because in t’s different feasible sub-SUGs,
the weight portion of feasible paths that crossing the same
node is usually variant. However, there are still exceptions:
Lemma 1 If all the sensitive values in the sensitive domain
can randomly updated to any other value (including itself),
the disclosure risks of the existing sensitive information are
invariant regardless how to release the new publications.
Proof: The proof of lemmas can be found in [8].
The lemma also implies the anonymization problem of
dynamic dataset can be reduced to several independent
anonymization problem of static dataset when the internal
updates on sensitive values are totally random. Because the
random updates of sensitive values lead different publications
to no correlation: Tn and Tn+1 are entirely independent.
Generally, we have the following lemma for dynamic dataset
which theoretically demonstrates at what time the disclosure
of sensitive information happens:
Lemma 2 Regardless how to publish the dataset, for any
positive integer i and n (i ≤ n), rn(t′i) = 1 holds iff |V
′
i | = 1
holds in the corresponding feasible sub-SUG.
C. SUG Applicability Demonstration
As mentioned, SUG is a general privacy disclosure frame-
work for re-publication problem. Exploiting it to analysis any
re-publication problem, we follow two steps:
1) Constructing the record’s SUG and deducing the corre-
sponding feasible sub-SUG;
2) Calculating the weight of each feasible path and estimat-
ing disclosure risks.
Let us apply the framework to re-publish external dynamic
dataset [4]. Since there is no internal update in the external
dynamic dataset, each node have at most one incoming edge
and one outgoing edge in a record’s SUG; each edge connects
two nodes which represent the same sensitive value. After
excluding the invalidate information in the SUG, the feasible
sub-SUG must have the following characteristics:
1) For each feasible path, all the nodes it crossed represent
the same sensitive value;
2) For each node, there is only one feasible path crossing it.
Intuitively, the feasible sub-SUG contains several parallel
feasible paths and each one contains the same sensitive value.
According to lemma 2, the disclosure will occur when there
is only one feasible path left. The analysis also hints us that,
if we can guarantee that the feasible sub-SUG always have
several indistinguishable feasible paths, the disclosure will not
happen7. Moreover, employing our estimation method, we will
get that the re-publication risk of m-Invariance is 1/m as each
feasible path has equal weight.
The analysis above also convinced us that re-publication
of external dynamic dataset is a special case of our problem.
Revisiting fully dynamic dataset, as illustrated in fig. 2(b), the
SUG of each record is more complex and the risks are difficult
to control. However, if we can make a similar guarantee: in
each record’s feasible sub-SUG, there always exists several
indistinguishable feasible paths and each candidate node set
contains several nodes, at least the disclosure will not occur.
IV. ANONYMIZATION PRINCIPLE
According to the analysis in the previous section, if a
record’s sensitive information is well protected in each sep-
arate publication, the disclosure is mainly rose by the pruning
7In fact, that is the basic idea of m-Invariance: it guarantees that there are
always m parallel feasible paths for each record.
to its SUG. In other words, if we prevent the possible pruning
to the record’s SUG and always guarantee |V ′i | > 1 for all i,
the disclosure of sensitive information will never happen.
Referring to a dataset containing a mount of records, we
should pay more attention: when publishing the dataset, we
need guarantee that there will be no pruning to all the records
at any time, as to prevent the chain-actions of disclosure [6].
Specifically, two requirements need to be met:
1) All the records’ sensitive information is well preserved
in each separate publication;
2) At any time, there is no pruning to all the records’ SUG
so as to maintain the indistinguishability of sensitive
values.
In this paper, we use m-unique [4] to illustrate the sensitive
value indistinguishability: if there are at least m records in
QI-group g and all of them have distinct sensitive values, we
call g is m-unique; a published table is m-unique if all the
QI-groups in it are m-unique.
A. m-Distinct
Before presenting our method, we formulate the following
concept to describe the update candidates of a value:
Definition 12 (Candidate Update Set) Suppose a is an ele-
ment in the domain of attribute A (a ∈ dom(A)), its candidate
update set CUS(a) is the union of some elements in dom(A),
such that a has non-zero update probability to it.
Note that if b ∈ CUS(a), then CUS(b) ⊆ CUS(a) must
hold8. Similarly, we have the following notion for a group of
sensitive values:
Definition 13 (Update Set Signature) Suppose QI-group g
contains n records and their sensitive values are s1, s2, ..., sn,
respectively. Then g’s update set signature USS(g) is a multi-
set: {CUS(s1), CUS(s2), ..., CUS(sn)}.
Since USS is a multi-set of CUS, the same CUS may
appear several times in a USS, because several records may
have the same sensitive value and different sensitive values
may even have the equal candidate update set. Record t’s
update set signature, which is inherited from the QI-group it
is in, is denoted by USS(t). It is obvious that a record’s USS
is dynamic as the re-publication progress evolves, because in
different time the sensitive values of its QI-group are variant.
In this paper, we say that USSi and USSj (i 6= j) are
intersectable, if they have equal number of CUS and there
exists a one-to-one map between two CUS in USSi and
USSj , such that the intersection of the two CUS is non-
empty; moreover, if the CUS of USSj is a subset of the
CUS of USSi, we call USSi implies USSj (denote as
USSi ⊇ USSj).
Next, we explains under what conditions, a set of values is
a legal update instances of a USS:
8The result is straightforward using the method of Reduction to Absurdity.
Definition 14 (Legal Update Instance) A set of sensitive
values S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} is a legal update instance of a
USS if the following conditions hold:
1) The number of sensitive values in S equals to the number
of CUS in the USS: |S| = |USS|.
2) For any value si in S, there is at least one candidate
update set CUSj such that si ∈ CUSj .
3) For any candidate update set CUSj in USS, there is at
least one sensitive value si in S such that si ∈ CUSj .
If a group of sensitive values are a legal update instance of
a USS, in the perspective of adversary, every value in it can
not be excluded. Suppose t’s candidate sensitive set C is a
legal update instance of its USS in the previous publication,
then the deduce procedure (as illustrated in section III-A) can
not exclude any node or edge: all the information in its SUG
are validate. Hence the threats rose by invalidate information
exclusion are prevented.
Example 5 In the example of section I-B, Julia’s candidate
sensitive set C1 is {Dyspepsia, Pneumonia}. With the help
of implicit background knowledge, we know that
CUS(Dyspepsia) = {Dyspepsia,Gastritis, other digestive
system diseases} and CUS(Pneumonia) =
{Pneumonia, F lu, Lung Cancer, other respiratory
system diseases}. Thus Julia’s update set signature in the
1st release is {CUS(Dyspepsia), CUS(Pneumonia)}.
According to definition 14, if we randomly pick out an
element from CUS(Dyspepsia) and CUS(Pneumonia) re-
spectively, then the two elements must be a legal instance of
USS(Julia1).
Now we are ready for our anonymization principle:
Definition 15 (m-Distinct) T is a dynamic dataset, a sequen-
tial releases of T : T ∗1 , T ∗2 , T ∗3 , ..., T ∗n are m-Distinct if it meets:
1) For all i ∈ [1, n], T ∗i is m-unique.
2) Suppose for any record t, Ti and Tj (i < j) are two
neighboring releases which both contain t (ti ∈ Ti, tj ∈
Tj). For all i ∈ [1, n], tj’s candidate sensitive set Cj is
a legal update instance of USS(ti).
The rationale of m-Distinct is that, we adopt m-unique to
maintain the indistinguishability of sensitive values in each
separate publication; then when releasing new publication, we
carefully partition the records so that the indistinguishability of
sensitive values is still maintained. In other words, the concept
of “legal update instance” guarantees that there is no inference
rose by information exclusion.
Revisit example 5, since Julia’s candidate sensitive set
C2={Dyspepsia, Lung Cancer} is a legal update instance
of {CUS(Dyspepsia), CUS(Pneumonia)}, T ∗1 and T ∗2 are
2-Distinct with respect to Julia.
Deriving from definition 15, when releasing a new version
of T and maintaining the m-Distinct property meanwhile, we
only need the information of most recent versions of the
records. Specifically, if the two following conditions hold:
1) the new version T ∗new is m-unique;
2) for any record t (tnew ∈ Tnew), suppose tpre is t’s most
recent version, then tnew’s candidate sensitive set is a
legal update instance of USS(tpre).
Then the sequential release including T ∗new are also m-
Distinct. Furthermore, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If a sequential releases of T : T ∗1 , T ∗2 , T ∗3 , ...,
T ∗n are m-Distinct, then for any record t ∈ T , |V
′
i | ≥ m
holds for all the candidate node sets in its feasible sub-SUG
G′n(V
′, E′).
Lemma 3 reveals that the disclosure will not occur if the
releases are m-Distinct. A larger m usually makes the disclo-
sure more difficult because more values are indistinguishable
in each QI-group.
B. m-Distinct Extension
m-Distinct guarantees that no disclosure of sensitive values
will occur, however, sometimes more strict anonymization
principle may be needed to limit the re-publication risk. Thus
we have the following principle called m-Distinct∗:
1) the requirements of m-Distinct hold.
2) Suppose for any record t, Tfirst is the first release
contains t (tfirst ∈ Tfirst). then CUSα ∩ CUSβ =
φ (α 6= β) holds for any two candidate update sets in
USS(tfirst).
Then the following consequence holds:
Lemma 4 If a sequential releases of T : T ∗1 , T ∗2 , T ∗3 , ..., T ∗n
are m-Distinct∗, then the re-publication risk is at most 1/m.
The key of m-Distinct∗ is the 2nd condition. It implies that,
in the same QI-group, every sensitive value’s CUS does not
overlap with the other values’.
By applying our privacy disclosure framework, m-Distinct∗
can limit the re-publication risk to 1/m because it guarantees
that there are at least m parallel feasible paths in every record’s
feasible sub-SUG. However, m-Distinct∗ may not be met in
general case: there may not exist m sensitive values to form
a QI-group in which there is no overlap between the CUS of
any two sensitive values.
V. ALGORITHM
We now present an algorithm to meet m-Distinct. According
to the analysis in previous section, if every new release of the
dataset meets the two conditions in previous section, then m-
Distinct persists in the sequential release. Thus we put the
attention on releasing T ∗n based on the previous releases.
When anonymizing Tn, the crucial part of maintaining m-
Distinct property is that, every record’s new candidate sensitive
set should be a legal update instance of its previous USS.
The basic idea of our algorithm is to assign records to proper
bucket according to their USS such that we can always find a
way to partition records into QI-group, of which the candidate
sensitive set is a legal update instance of these records. The
overview of our algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
In our algorithm we introduce counterfeit records when no
enough record in the dataset helps to meet m-Distinct. Note
Algorithm 1 Overview of Our Algorithm
Require: Tn: the nth version of T ;
m: the user configured parameter for m-Distinct;
tpre: the most recent version of t, where t ∈ Tn and t has
appeared in T before;
1: create buckets Qbuc according to the records which has tpre;
2: assign records to proper position of proper bucket in Qbuc;
3: partition the unassigned records into m-unique QI-groups;
4: recursively split each bucket into two until no more split
left (forms QI-groups);
5: generalize each QI-group;
6: publish the generalized QI-groups and counterfeit statistics.
that the only usage of the counterfeit records is to maintain
the sensitive value indistinguishability of a QI-group.
Except for meeting the anonymization principle, we also
aims to minimize two criterions: the number of counterfeit
records and the generalization of QI attributes. Because more
counterfeit records will cover up more characteristics of the
original dataset and more generalization will lead to more
information loss, both are harm to the dataset utility.
Our algorithm mainly contains the three following phases.
A. Phase 1: Creating Buckets
Algorithm 2 Create Buckets
Require: Qrec: the queue of records in Tn;
tpre: the most recent version of t, where t ∈ Tn and t has
appeared in T before;
1: Let Qbuc and Qtmp be empty queues of buckets;
2: for all record t in Qrec do
3: if tpre exists then
4: create Bnew such that USS(Bnew) = USS(tpre);
5: if Bnew does not exist in Qbuc then
6: enqueue(Qbuc, Bnew);
7: for every 2 buckets Bi, Bj ∈ Qbuc(i < j) do
8: if USS(Bi) and USS(Bj) are intersectable then
9: pick out their highest scored intersection plan USSnew ;
10: create Bnew such that USS(Bnew) = USSnew ;
11: if Bnew does not exist in Qbuc and Qtmp then
12: enqueue(Qtmp, Bnew);
13: append(Qbuc, Qtmp);
14: return Qbuc;
Our algorithm (algorithm 2) will first create buckets which
the records are possibly in. Note that a bucket is only identified
by its USS.
Suppose for any record t ∈ Tn, tpre is t’s most recent
version. First, we create a bucket Bnew for t, such that
USS(Bnew) equals to USS(tpre) (lines 2-6). We only skip
record t if such bucket is already exist, or this is the first time
t appears in the dataset. We denote an entry of bucket B as
a candidate update set in USS(B). The number of entries
equals to the number of candidate update sets of B.
In the second step (lines 7-12), we generate new bucket
based on the buckets created in the previous step: if any
two buckets are intersectable, we create a new bucket whose
update set signature is the intersection of their USS; if there
are several possible intersection plans, we choose the one
with highest score: the higher proportion of the overlapped
elements, the higher score of the intersection plan.
At the end of this phase, we have all the possible buckets
for the records of Tn which have appeared before. For the
new records, we will create new bucket for them later, if no
existing bucket is suitable.
B. Phase 2: Assigning Records
Algorithm 3 Assign Records
Require: Qrec: the queue of sorted records (CNTbuc ≥ 1 for all);
CNTbuc(t): the number of buckets t can be assigned;
Qt: the queue of suitable buckets for record t.
1: while Qrec is not empty do
2: t←dequeue(Qrec);
3: max score← −∞;{global maximum score of t}
4: while Qt is not empty do
5: B ←dequeue(Qt);
6: buc score← −∞;{maximum score of t’s assignment in B}
7: for entry ei in B do
8: if t[S] ∈ ei then
9: tmp score←get score(t, B, ei);
10: if tmp score==buc score then
11: buc entry←choose entry(buc entry, i);
12: else if tmp score>buc score then
13: buc score←tmp score;
14: buc entry←i;
15: if buc score>max score then
16: max score←buc score;
17: max entry←buc entry;
18: max buc← B;
19: assign(t,max buc, max entry);
The main task of this phase is to assign records to proper
bucket and the corresponding entry. If record t and bucket B
meet USS(tpre) ⊇ USS(B) and t[S] is covered by USS(B),
then t can be assigned to B. The reason is that, when we pick
out an record from each entry of the bucket and forms a QI-
group (will carry on in next phase), if there is no duplicate
sensitive value in the group, the QI-group must hold m-
Distinct. Because the candidate sensitive set of t now must
be a legal update instance of USS(B) as well as USS(tpre).
Referring to a record which appears in the dataset the first
time, it can be assign to a bucket only if its current sensitive
value is covered by the bucket’s USS.
In order to facilitate the task, we first calculate CNTbuc(t),
the number of buckets t can be assigned, and sort the records
increasingly according to their CNTbuc.
The records which have no existing buckets to be assigned
in (CNTbuc=0), must also be the first time appears in the
dataset. Thus we process them separately: partitioning them
into QI-groups which are m-unique. It can be done by exploit-
ing existing anonymization algorithms [9], [10], [4] because
they have no previous version involved. Note that counterfeit
records will be added in case they are not m-eligible9.
9a group of records are m-eligible [4], if there are no more than 1/m
records have the same sensitive value. These records can be partitioned into
m-unique QI-groups only if they are m-eligible [10].
The rest of the records, which can be assigned to at least one
bucket, will be assigned to a bucket sequentially as algorithm
3. Since there are K! (denote K as the number of rest records)
orders to assign these records, our greed algorithm starts the
assignment by processing the records with least CNTbuc,
because they have less optional buckets and can be determined
with less overheads.
In algorithm 3, we consider each possible bucket (line 4) and
entry for a record so as to get the highest scored assignment.
A record t can be assigned to an entry ei only if the CUS it
represented contains t[S] (line 8). Specifically, the score of t
with respect to ei of B (line 9) is calculated as follows:
(i) We define ǫ to indicate t’s contribution to counterfeit
counts if t is assigned to ei. ǫ = 1 means t’s assign-
ment will not increase the counterfeit count in B; other-
wise, ǫ is −1. So we first calculate parameter δ, such that
δ = max{Fmax, |e1|, |e2|, ..., |e|USS(B)||}, where Fmax is the
maximal frequency of sensitive value in B. Then we set ǫ to
be −1 if the frequency of t[S] in B equals δ or |ei| equals δ.
(ii) We also define a parameter to indicate t’s contribution
to the further generation: λ = Zaft/Zbef . Zbef and Zaft are
the |QI|-dimensional area generated by all the records in B
before and after t’s assignment. Apparently, λ ≥ 1 and a larger
value indicates t’s assignment brings into more generation.
(iii) At last we return the following score:
score =
{
1/λ if ǫ = 1
−λ if ǫ = −1
(3)
The above equation blends t’s contributions to counterfeit
count and generalization together. Obviously, a larger score
of t’s assignment shows that it will bring into less counterfeit
records and generalization.
When two entries in B has the same score, we assign the
record into the entry with less already assigned records (line 11
choose entry), so as to get a more balanced bucket. Once we
get the assignment with least score, we immediately assign
this record to the bucket by pushing it into the corresponding
bucket entry (line 19).
After all the records are assigned, the buckets will be
balanced with counterfeit records so as they are m-eligible.
Thus we calculate δ as before, then add counterfeit records to
the entries so that each entry has δ records.
C. Phase 3: Generating QI-groups
Now every bucket is m-eligible and is well prepared for
generating QI-groups. Since there are |USS(B)| entries in B
and each one has δ records, it is workable to split the bucket
into δ QI-groups: each one contains only one record of an
entry and all the records have distinct sensitive values.
In this phase, we will recursively split each bucket into
two children until only one record left in each entry. In order
to perform further split on the generated buckets, the child
buckets should also be m-eligible. Specifically, both of them
should meet the following conditions:
1) balanced;
2) Fmax should not be larger than the number of records in
each entry.
Besides, in order to generate QI-groups with least informa-
tion loss, each split we aims to minimize the generalization.
Similar to [4], we calculate score for a split plan as follows:
split score =
2∑
i=1
(|Bi| ·
d∑
j=1
li,j
Ij
) (4)
where li,j and Ij are the minimum interval of attribute qj in
Bi and B, respectively.
To find the split plan with least score, we organize the
records of a bucket in a queue and sort them according to
attribute qi. Then we greedily pick out records from the queue
so as to form two child buckets. The split plan with least
score is kept. After we do the above procedure for all the QI
attributes, we choose the minimum one and apply it to B.
The key of this phase is how to pick out records so
as to form two child buckets which both meet the above
conditions. In our algorithm, each time we traversal the queue
and pick out |USS(B)| records, which are all from different
entries and have no duplicate sensitive value. The pick-out
procedure executes recursively so as to pick out more records
and generate all the possible split plans. In the worst case,
δ
′ |USS(B)|−1
operations may be performed in order to pick out
|USS(B)| legal records. δ′ is the current number of records
which are still left in each entry.
Note that if B can not be split again and it has counterfeit
record in entry ei, we will randomly assign the counterfeit
record a sensitive value, which is pick out from the CUS that
ei represented and different from the existing values in B.
At last, we generalize all the QI-groups formed in phase
2 and 3 and publish them together with the corresponding
counterfeit statistics.
D. Extension
The presented algorithm is a general method to meet m-
Distinct. According to the definition of m-Distinct∗, it has an
additional constrain on the 1st release of any record in contrast
to m-Distinct. Thus we only need to handle the QI-group
with new records particularly: grantees that it has at least m
records with different sensitive values and the CUS of any
two records’ sensitive values are not overlapped.
To achieving this, in each publication, we will first check
whether there are suitable buckets created in phase 1 for the
new record. The record will be assigned in if such a bucket
found, otherwise we partitioning these new record into new
QI-groups as did in the anonymization of static dataset but
with an addition criterion: in each QI-group, no overlap exists
between any two sensitive values’ CUS. For the old records,
we process them no difference to the procedure in m-Distinct.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
The experiments were performed on a 3GHz Intel IV
processor machine with 2GB memory. All the algorithms are
implemented in C++.
TABLE VII
DATASET DESCRIPTION
attribute Age Gender Marital. Education Occupation
dom. size 100 2 6 17 50
type num. cat. cat. cat. cat.
A. Experiment Setup
We use a real dataset OCC from http://ipums.org, which
is also adopted by [3], [4]. The dataset consists of 200k
records with four QI attributes and one sensitive attribute.
More detail information of the dataset is given in table VII.
Vital parameters of the experiment are set as follows:
External Update. Since the external update property is well
investigated in [4], in our experiment, we use a fixed external
update rate: we began to publish T1 with 20,000 records which
are randomly chose from the original dataset; then in each new
release Ti, we randomly remove 2,000 records from Ti−1 and
insert 5,000 records from the rest of records. The dataset will
be re-published 20 times.
Internal Update. As no existing dataset contains internal
updates information explicitly, we generate internal updates
according to the semantic of each attribute. In the span of
[i, i+ 1], the internal updates are configured as follows:
• Age: the age of each record will increase 1 till reach 100;
• Gender: will not change;
• Marital Status/ Education: will update according to the
specific semantic of each value. E.g., the marital status
of a record may update from married to any one in
{married, divorced, separated, widowed} but can not
update to be never-married; its education may update
from bachelor to any eduction not lower than bachelor.
• Occupation: since the internal update on sensitive at-
tribute is critical to the problem of this paper, we
introduce internal update diameter d to describe the
flexibility of internal updates on sensitive attribute. An
sensitive value’s d equals to the size of its candidate
set10. Apparently, a large diameter indicates more flexible
internal updates.
By default, we set d to be 10, which means a person’s
occupation may stay the same or change to be nine other
similar jobs with equal probabilities. Noticing that in each
publication, we set the internal updates on sensitive values
only randomly occurred on 5,000 records.
B. Invalidation of Existing methods
We first perform experiments to show the inadequacy of the
existing anonymization methods.
The l-diversity algorithm in [10] is exploited to re-publish
the dynamic dataset. Fig. 3(a) demonstrates the total number
of vulnerable sensitive values if the dataset is re-published
using l-diversity. Note that there are n versions of sensitive
value related to a record if it is published n times. The result
confirms that l-diversity is insufficient to re-publish dynamic
dataset, e.g. about 66% percentage of the published sensitive
10For the convenience, we set all the sensitive values’ candidate sets to be
the same size in our experiment.
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Fig. 4. Number of invalidate records
values are disclosed when the dataset is published 20 times
using 2-diversity. Although a larger l will lead less disclosure,
the number of disclosed sensitive values increases as the re-
publication process evolves.
We also test the number of vulnerable sensitive values
versus internal update diameter (fig. 3(b)). A smaller diam-
eter usually leads to more vulnerable sensitive information,
because the updates on sensitive values are less flexible and
more pruning will be performed when deducing the feasible
sub-SUG. Besides, the total vulnerable information decreases
as l grows, because lemma 2 is more difficult to be met when
more records are plunged into a group.
In the next experiment, we show the invalidation of m-
Invariance. We adopt the algorithm in [4] to re-publish dataset
and report the total number of invalidate records. As expected,
the invalidate counts increase gradually as new publication
releases (fig. 4(a)).
Since the invalidation of m-Invariance is cause by internal
updates, we test the invalidate record counts with respect to the
diameter (fig. 4(b)).The invalidate counts increase dramatically
with respect to the increase of diameter. Specially, when the
diameter is 1, which means each value can not update to be
anyone else, there is no invalidate records. That reconfirmed
that the invalidation reason of m-Invariance is internal update.
C. m-Distinct Evaluation
In this subsection, we will evaluate our solution from the
following aspects:
1) Query Accuracy: We test the query accuracy of
anonymization data by answering aggregate queries as follows:
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM Ti
WHERE Q1 > a1 AND Q1 < b1
...
Q4 > a4 AND Q4 < b4
S > a5 AND S < b5
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For each query, we configure its range as |bj − aj | = θ ·
|dom(Aj)|, where θ ∈ (0, 1]. Apparently, a query with larger
θ will involve more records and return a larger result.
The query error, which is the difference between the re-
turned results on Ti and T ∗i , is |R∗ −R|/R∗. R is the query
result on Ti and R∗ is the estimated result on T ∗i . Specifically,
the estimated result is the number of possible records which
are in QI-group g and covered by the query. Suppose the
records in g are uniformly distributed, the probability of a
record t meets the query is the product of probabilities that
t[Aj ] (i = 1, 2, ..., 5) is in the interval (aj , bj). Thus R∗ equals
to the product of the records count of g (excluding counterfeit
counts) and the above probability.
In this experiment, we randomly generate 10,000 queries
and report the median error. Fig. 5(a) shows the median errors
for different time and m. The median error increases smoothly
as time evolves, because the new inserted records for a QI-
group are usually not as ’well’ as the deleted ones; however,
as the result of 2(4)-Distinct demonstrated, the median error
will not increase anymore when re-publishing enough times.
Fig. 5(b) shows the median error versus different θ while
m = 4. As expected, the query with larger range gets more
accurate result, because when it covers more records, the
estimation are more close to the actual result. At last, in
fig. 6 we show the median error for different internal update
diameter. Since a larger diameter means more flexible internal
updates, which allows more records to be assigned in a bucket
and is more flexible to generate QI-groups, the accuracy
increases with d.
2) Counterfeit Counts: In this experiment we temporarily
configure the delete amount of each re-publication to be 3,000
because our initial setup leads to zero counterfeit count in
most of evaluations. We define the measurement as the average
counterfeit count per QI-group (denote as CNTg).
Fig. 7 plots the CNTg versus time when m = 6 and d =
5. CNTg increases at the beginning because more existing
QI-groups have records been removed, that leads to a more
urgency of counterfeit records in the balance step. However,
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Fig. 8. average CNTg per time
after the 7th publication, CNTg decreases as the total number
of counterfeit records becomes more and more stabilized and
the number of QI-groups are always increasing.
Then we fix m = 6 and show the average CNTg per time
with different configuration of d (fig. 8(a)). It is expected that
a larger diameter makes the publication with less counterfeit
records in each group, because it also means more flexible
assignment for the inserted records.
In fig. 8(b) we set d = 5 and measure the average CNTg
per time for different m-Distinct. The result of 8-Distinct is
the largest but also smaller than 2.
3) Computation Cost: According to the experiment setup,
the number of re-publication records is incremental as time
evolves. In order to accurately measure the cost of a single
re-publication procedure, we report the average running time
for re-publishing T ∗2 .
Fig. 9(a) demonstrates the computation cost with different
internal update diameter. A larger diameter can lead to higher
data utility (fig. 6) as well as always needs higher cost.
Because in phase 2, there may be more optional buckets for
a new inserted records and more records will be assigned in
the same bucket, which will lead to more cost when splitting
and generating QI-groups in the last phase.
We also observe the cost comparing to different m. The cost
decreases from 2 to 4 because a smaller m has less number of
buckets and each bucket has more records, which need more
split operations to generate QI-groups. However, the overhead
increases from 4 to 8, that is because when m becomes larger,
the major cost is how to find a legal split for a bucket with
least information loss, which is positively correlated to m (as
the analysis in section V-C).
VII. RELATED WORK
Most existing anonymization work is carried out on static
datasets, where records are inserted and/or deleted dynami-
cally. Different anonymization principles [2], [3], [10], [11],
[12], [13] have been proposed to preserve privacy and ensure
the sensitive information security from different perspectives.
In addition to resisting different kinds of disclosure attacks [6],
[10], [14], [15], the anonymization principles also struggle
to achieve privacy preservation with less information loss.
Many algorithms [1], [9], [14], [16], [17] have are also been
proposed to generalize datasets to meet the principles with
little overhead.
Relatively, the data re-publication has received less atten-
tion. Wang and Fung [18] first studied the problem of securely
releasing multi-shots of a static dataset. The main challenge
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is the inference caused by joining between multiple releases.
They proposed a solution to properly anonymize the current
release so as to control possible inferences.
The anonymization work on dynamic datasets was initiated
in [5]. Byun et al. tackled the problem of incremental dataset
anonymization, where a dataset is updated by only record
insertion. Their solution supports neither record deletion nor
attribute value update.
Xiao and Tao [4] first conducted anonymization on external
dynamic datasets, which are updated by both record insertion
and deletion. The challenge lies in that the inserted and deleted
records may cause the disclosure risk of both themselves
and the remained records, and even lead to the disclosure
of individuals’ sensitive values. Their solution, called m-
Invariance [4], [19], guarantees that each time the QI-group
to which a record belongs contains the same set of sensitive
values.
In short, all existing work do not consider internal updates,
and their solutions are invalid for fully dynamic datasets. This
constitutes the task for our paper to solve.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper challenges a new problem—enabling anonymiza-
tion of dynamic datasets with both internal updates and
external updates. For this goal, a novel privacy disclosure
framework, which is applicable to all dynamic scenarios,
is proposed. A new anonymization principle m-Distinct and
corresponding algorithm are presented for anonymous re-
publication of fully dynamic datasets. Extensive experiments
conducted on real world data demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed solution.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney, “Generalizing data to provide anonymity
when disclosing information,” in PODS, 1998, p. 188.
[2] M. E. Nergiz, M. Atzori, and C. Clifton, “Hiding the presence of
individuals from shared databases,” in SIGMOD, 2007, pp. 665–676.
[3] X. Xiao and Y. Tao, “Anatomy: Simple and effective privacy preserva-
tion,” in VLDB, 2006, pp. 139–150.
[4] X. Xiao and Y. Tao, “m-invariance: towards privacy preserving re-
publication of dynamic datasets,” in SIGMOD, 2007, pp. 689–700.
[5] J.-W. Byun, Y. Sohn, E. Bertino, and N. Li, “Secure anonymization for
incremental datasets,” in SDM, 2006, pp. 48–63.
[6] Y. Tao, X. Xiao, J. Li, and D. Zhang, “On anti-corruption privacy
preserving publication,” in ICDE, 2008.
[7] F. Bacchus, A. J. Grove, J. Y. Halpern, and D. Koller, “From statistical
knowledge bases to degrees of belief,” in Artif. Intell., 1996, pp. 87(1–
2):75–143.
[8] F. Li and S. Zhou. (2008) Dealing with more updates: Towards
anonymous re-publication of dynamic datasets. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/list/cs.DB/recent
[9] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeWitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Mondrian multidi-
mensional k-anonymity,” in ICDE, 2006, p. 25.
[10] A. Machanavajjhala, J. Gehrke, D. Kifer, and M. Venkitasubramaniam,
“l-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity,” in ICDE, 2006, p. 24.
[11] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” Interna-
tional Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems,
vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 557–570, 2002.
[12] X. Xiao and Y. Tao, “personalized privacy preservation,” in SIGMOD,
2006, pp. 229–240.
[13] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian, “t-closeness: Privacy beyond
k-anonymity and l-diversity,” in ICDE, 2007, pp. 106–115.
[14] Q. Zhang, N. Koudas, D. Srivastava, and T. Yu, “Aggregate query
answering on anonymized tables,” in ICDE, 2007, pp. 116–125.
[15] R. C.-W. Wong, A. W.-C. Fu, K. Wang, and J. Pei, “Minimality attack
in privacy preserving data publishing,” in VLDB, 2007, pp. 543–554.
[16] G. Ghinita, Y. Tao, and P. Kalnis, “On the anonymization of sparse
high-dimensional data,” in ICDE, 2008.
[17] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeWitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Incognito: Efficient
full-domain k-anonymitys,” in SIGMOD, 2005, pp. 49–60.
[18] K. Wang and B. C. M. Fung, “Anonymizing sequential releases,” in
KDD, 2006, pp. 414–423.
[19] X. Xiao and Y. Tao, “Dynamic anonymization: Accurate statistical
analysis with privacy preservation,” in SIGMOD, 2008.
APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose t′1, t
′
2, ..., t
′
I are the sequential
versions of record t which exist in the corresponding releases
of T ′ . For any 1 ≤ i ≤ I , we have t′i ∈ T
′
i . Regardless how
to release T ′I+1, if we can prove rI(t
′
i) = rI+1(t
′
i) holds for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ I , lemma 1 must holds.
Derive from the condition presented in the lemma, we know
that t’s feasible sub-SUG G′I+1(V
′
, E
′
) can be constructed
on the basis of G′I(V
′
, E
′
): add |CI+1| nodes which represent
the sensitive candidate set CI+1 and draw edges from every
node in the last sensitive candidate set of G′I(V
′
, E
′
) to every
new node.
Suppose p′k is any feasible path in
G
′
I+1(V
′
, E
′
), its weight can be represented as
w(p
′
k) = w(pk)w(v
′
I,xI
, v
′
I+1,xI+1
)w(v
′
I+1,xI+1
) =
1
|CI+1|
w(pk)w(v
′
I+1,xI+1
), where pk is a feasible path
in G′I(V
′
, E
′
) and contained by p′k; node v
′
I,xI
and v′I+1,xI+1
are in V ′I and V
′
I+1 respectively and crossed by p
′
k.
According to equation 2, we have rI(t
′
i) =
PKi
k
′
=1
w(p
k
′ )
P
K
k=1
w(pk)
.
Similarly, we have rI+1(t
′
i) =
PKi·|CI+1|
k
′
=1
w(p
′
k
′ )
PK·|CI+1|
k=1
w(p
′
k
)
. According
to the construction process stated above, in G′I+1(V
′
, E
′
), the
number of total feasible paths (t′i related feasible paths) are
|CI+1| times of the count in G
′
I(V
′
, E
′
). Collaborate rI+1(t
′
i)
with p′k, we have rI+1(t
′
i) =
P|CI+1|
m
′
=1
PKi
k
′
=1
w(p
k
′ )w(v
′
I+1,x
m
′
)
P|CI+1|
m=1
PKi
k=1
w(pk)w(v
′
I+1,xm
)
=
PKi
k
′
=1
{w(p
k
′ )
P|CI+1|
m
′
=1
w(v
′
I+1,x
m
′
)}
PKi
k=1
{w(pk)
P|CI+1|
m=1 w(v
′
I+1,xm
)}
.
Since the weight sum of the nodes in V ′I+1 is 1, we also
have
∑|CI+1|
m
′=1
w(v
′
I+1,x
m
′
) = 1 and
∑|CI+1|
m=1 w(v
′
I+1,xm
) = 1.
Thus rI+1(t
′
i) =
PKi
k
′
=1
w(p
k
′ )
P
K
k=1 w(pk)
holds, which is also equal to
rI(t
′
i). Hence Lemma 1 is proved.
Proof of lemma 2. According to equation 2, rn(t
′
i) = 1
implies that the weight sum of feasible paths crossing the node
represents t′ [S] equals to the total sum of all the feasible paths.
Since every feasible path must cross only one node in V ′i
and each node must in at least one feasible path, the above
condition satisfied only when there is only one node in V ′i .
Similarly, |V ′i | = 1 directly implies Ki = K and∑Ki
k
′=1
w(pk′ ) =
∑K
k=1 w(pk), which will lead to rn(t
′
i) = 1.
Hence lemma 2 is proved.
Proof of lemma 3. Suppose t is any record involved in the
sequential release of T . If the releases are m-Distinct, there
are at least m distinct sensitive values for each QI-group t is
in, because each release is m-unique. That implies that in t’s
SUG Gn(V,E), |Vi| > m holds for any candidate node set.
Now if we can prove that the deduce from Gn(V,E) to
G
′
n(V
′
, E
′
) will not delete any edge and node, |V ′i | > m
must hold for G′n(V
′
, E
′
) of t. Actually this holds because
the candidate sensitive set of ti+1 C(ti+1) must be a legal
update instance of C(ti), which also means that any node in
Vi at least has an outgoing edge connecting to a node in Vi+1
as well as any node in Vi+1 at least has an incoming edge
from a node in Vi. Since this holds for all i, no deletion will
happen in the deduce procedure. Hence the lemma is proved.
Proof of lemma 4. According to the definition of m-
Distinct∗, if a sequential releases are m-Distinct∗, they must
also be m-Distinct and lemma 3 hold.
Since CUSα ∩ CUSβ = φ (α 6= β) holds for any
two sensitive values in t1’s candidate sensitive set, in t’s
G
′
n(V
′
, E
′
), there does not exist two edges from V ′i to V
′
i+1
(i = 1) cross the same node. According to the transitivity of
updates, the above property also holds for i = 1, 2, ..., n. Thus
we can derive that there are at least m parallel feasible paths
in t’s G′n(V
′
, E
′
). Following the random world assumption,
each feasible path has equal weight and the disclosure risk for
t’s any sensitive value is at most 1/m (equation 2). Hence the
re-publication risk is at most 1/m and lemma 4 is proved.
